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What is GSDO? 
• Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program 
– 1 of 3 NASA Programs based at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
– Established to develop and use the complex equipment required to safely 
handle rockets and spacecraft during assembly, transport, and launch 
• The GSDO Program Vision 
– Launching the world’s most powerful, advanced launch vehicles and 
spacecraft. 
• The GSDO Program Mission 
– To be the driving force that transforms the Kennedy Space Center into the 
world’s premier multi-user launch and landing spaceport. 
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For more information, visit: http:/go.nasa.gov/groundsystems  
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What is RMA? 
• RMA is the acronym for Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
– Reliability (R) 
• The probability (likelihood) that a component or system will perform its intended 
function with no failures for a given period of time (mission time) when used under 
specific operating conditions (test environment or operating environment) 
– Maintainability (M) 
• The probability a failed item will be restored or repaired to a specified condition 
within a given period of time 
– Availability (A) 
• The probability that a repairable system will perform its intended function at a given 
point in time or over a specified period of time when operated and maintained in a 
prescribed manner.  Thus , availability is a function of reliability and maintainability 
 
• If “R” is enough, then no need for “M” to achieve “A”; if “R” is not enough, 
then “M” is needed to achieve “A” 
f(R,M) = A 
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RMA Analysis Purpose 
5 
• To reduce lifecycle cost by: 
– Efficiently and effectively identifying limitations within a system that may cause a 
failure before the intended lifetime 
– Identify unreliable systems that may pose a safety or health hazard 
– Providing specific reliability requirements for component  procurement 
– To identify wasted efforts and hardware that were intended to improve Availability, 
but are providing little value 
 
• To study, characterize, measure, and analyze the failure and repair of systems 
in order to: 
– Improve their operational use by increasing their design life 
– Eliminate or reduce the likelihood of failures and safety risks 
– Reduce downtime (maintenance), thereby increasing available operating time 
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FFBD = Functional Flow Block Diagram 
RBDA= Reliability Block Diagram Analysis 
FMEA= Failure Mode & Effects Analysis 
FTA = Fault Tree Analysis 
PRA= Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Source: Tim Adams KSC-NE 
FTA 
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RMA Design Life Analysis Process 
Safety & Mission Assurance 
• Ideally, the Reliability Engineering process looks like this: 
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GSDO RMA: Solution to a Challenge 
• GSDO Program needs to deliver high launch probability 
– Lunar missions and beyond require multiple launches and payloads to achieve mission 
goals 
– Commercial, DoD, and NASA customers will desire high availability from Ground Systems 
for launch support 
– The cost of each launch "scrub" is severe 
• De-tanking vehicles, re-synchronizing orbits, rescheduling Range conflicts, resting crew, etc   
• If a ground systems cause this scrub (when the vehicle was otherwise "Available"), then the 
community's penalty is even more severe 
• High Probability of Successful launch is needed; however, challenges were 
faced: 
– KSC Ground Systems delivered 88% probability of launch during Space Shuttle Program 
(SSP) for any given launch countdown 
– KSC Ground Systems Constellation Program (CxP) requirement was 99% probability of 
launch for the last 10 hours of launch countdown 
– GSDO Program requirement is 98% Inherent Launch Availability for any given launch 
countdown 
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Example of Probability of Architecture on Any Given Launch Attempt* 
*Does not necessarily represent actual risk probabilities. 
• Risk Factors for GSDO: 
 
• Risks for launch probability: 
– GSDO 
– Space Launch System (SLS) – 
the Launch Vehicle 
– Orion Multi-Purpose Crewed 
Vehicle (MPCV) 
– Environments – Launch Weather 
(Wx), Abort Wx, Sea State 
 
 
GSDO RMA: Solution to a Challenge 
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GSDO RMA: Requirement Development 
• Needed to put requirements in place to minimize risks to 
successful launch support  
– Only could control risks to Ground Systems  
design and upgrades 
– Allocated Availability requirements to  
ground systems 
• Inherent Launch Availability 
• Operational Availability* 
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Human Errors
Range Conflicts
Range Systems
Range Intrusions
Hurricanes
GSDO Launch Availability
Availability of XXX% for 30 days 
GSDO Inherent Launch Availability
Shall have an inherent launch 
availability of not less than 98% (TBR) 
for any single launch attempt.
GSDO Operational Availability
Shall achieve an operational availability (Ao) 
of at least 80% (TBR) from the start of launch 
countdown up to 14 days after a launch 
scrub.  
*The Operational Availability requirement is not the classical Operational Availability (Ao) calculation.  It is allocated as 
Inherent Availability (Ai).  From a system design point of view, the Ai is of more interest than Ao because spares and repair 
capability involve resources and trade-offs external to the system design. 
Operational availability cannot be controlled by system design, but Inherent Availability can 
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• Reliability allocations made via improved Reliability Apportionment 
Method 
– Accounts for knowledge of ground system performance, design, and 
use 
• Maintainability allocations made via an improved MIL-HDBK-417A 
method 
– Accounts for knowledge of ground system design, fault isolation 
techniques, and maintenance design characteristics, i.e., accessibility 
on the pad 
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GSDO RMA: Requirement Allocation 
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• “Management reserve” is built into each RMA requirement allowing for 
room for growth in GSDO subsystems 
– Fraction of the overall requirement is  
unallocated 
– If the cost for an availability improvement  
in a subsystem design outweighs the  
benefit in increased GSDO launch  
availability, there is enough management  
reserve to leave the design as-is, in most  
cases 
 
• The RMA analyses are completed during the design and upgrade 
schedules 
– RMA analysis is a required product for design milestones (30/60/90 or 45/90) 
– RMA analyses are performed as requested to assist in trade studies  
 
   
GSDO RMA: Requirement Allocation 
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• Allocation is an iterative process 
– As designs are analyzed, allocations may need to be adjusted  
GSDO RMA: Requirement Allocation 
12 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
Reliability  
Block Diagrams 
Component Data 
Importance Measures 
Cut Set Analysis 
Weibull Analysis 
2) Develop Reliability Block 
Diagram (RBD) from 
Subsystem Drawings
3) Determine Reliability, 
Maintainability, and 
Availability from RBD
6) Report Results and 
Recommendations in 
Subsystem RMA Reports
4) Determine Cut Sets 
from RBD
5) Determine Importance 
Measures from Cut Sets
1) Develop Component List 
from Subsystem Drawings
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• Example of component data using COTS software: 
PTC Windchill Quality Solutions (WQS) 
14 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• Analysis of components will sometimes include Weibull analysis to 
attempt to determine what type of failures are experienced  
– Used for similar components  
– Used for heritage subsystems to characterize failure types seen: 
• Early failures (burn-in) 
• Useful Life (random failures) 
• Wearout 
15 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
16 
• Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Analysis (RBDA): 
– Predicts reliability (uptime), maintainability (downtime), and availability 
(mission readiness being a function of uptime and downtime) 
– The RBDA method is used to estimate and analyze the reliability and 
availability for the systems containing at least two or more elements 
• RBDA is a “top-down” method in success space 
• Analyzes Reliability (and Availability) relationships 
– Quantitative 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• RMA Team converts each drawing (mechanical and electrical) into a 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
– Verify accuracy and understanding of the components and their connections 
with the design team 
17 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• RMA team determines the RMA of the subsystem by using both analytical and 
Monte-Carlo simulation calculations with at least 1,000,000 iterations. 
– Confidence Level set at 95% 
 
• Compare results to requirement 
 
 
 
 
• Perform sensitivity analysis to verify consistency in simulations 
– Different random number seeds for Monte-Carlo simulations 
Reliability 
(for 24 hrs) 
Maintainability 
(hrs) 
Availability 
(Ainh) 
0.998448 12.59 0.999529 
Reliability 
(for 24 hrs) 
Maintainability 
(hrs) 
Availability 
(Ainh) 
0.99900 48 0.998017 
RMA Requirements Simulation Results 
Random 
Seed 
Reliability 
Failures per 
Million 
MTTR 
(hrs) Lower Bound 
Point 
Estimate 
Upper 
Bound 
1 0.998564 0.998636 0.998708 54.07 12.59 
10 0.998448 0.998523 0.998598 67.10 12.61 
100 0.998557 0.998630 0.998703 58.08 12.63 
Availability 
Lower Bound Point Estimate 
Upper 
Bound 
0.999521 0.999562 0.999603 
0.999439 0.999484 0.999529 
0.999520 0.999561 0.999602 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• RMA Team performs Cut Set Analysis (CSA) 
– Set of basic events [failures] where the joint occurrence of these basic events results in 
the failure of the system.  
• Minimal cut set is a set that “cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set” 
– Provides clear indication of where most likely failure paths would be depending on the 
accuracy of the RBD and the accuracy of the failure data of the components 
19 
Cut Set 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• When a small number of failure paths make such large contributions to 
subsystem unavailability, isolating the key failure paths becomes obvious 
 
• This enables the design team to focus  
on either: 
– Improving the design to correct the high 
failure nodes (improving reliability), or 
– Ensuring that the component is able to  
be repaired to an operational state as  
quickly as possible (improving maintainability) 
20 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• Example of Cut Set Data 
CUM UNAVAIL % UNAVAIL % UNAVAIL Component Failure Component Failure 
5.92% 5.92% 0.000146 
ICPSU Position Encoder 1   
11.83% 5.92% 0.000146 
ICPSU Position Encoder 3   
13.13% 1.30% 3.22E-05 
4000 PSI Hydraulic Supply Pressure 
Xducer (36583MT-1)   
14.22% 1.08% 2.68E-05 
2200 PSI GN2 Supply Valve 
(36583A12)   
15.17% 0.95% 2.36E-05 
Fully Extend Switch (36596)   
15.97% 0.80% 1.97E-05 
Slow Extend/Retrack Valve (36583A9)   
16.67% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side A CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side B 
17.37% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side A Circuit Breaker (CB) 2A - Side B 
18.07% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side A Circuit Breaker (CB) to TB - Side B 
18.77% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side A Circuit Breaker to Chassis - Side B 
19.47% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side A 
Circuit Breaker to Ind & Enable - 
Side B 
20.17% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
Circuit Breaker (CB) 2A - Side A CB (GSP to RIO) 50A - Side B 
20.87% 0.70% 1.72742E-05 
Circuit Breaker (CB) 2A - Side A Circuit Breaker (CB) 2A - Side B 
21 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• GSDO RMA Team performs Importance Measure Analysis (IMA) 
– Assesses the importance of the components in the subsystem or the sensitivity of the subsystem 
RMA to changes in the components’ failure rates 
– Quantify the criticality of a particular component within a system design. 
– Used as tool for identifying system weakness, and to prioritize RMA improvement activities 
– Change in the failure rates of the components (or adding redundancy to account for the high failure 
rate) with the highest importance measure percent contribution will have the most significant effect 
on increasing subsystem reliability 
• This unique method described in paper written by RMA team, entitled, “Comparison 
Modeling of System Reliability for Future NASA projects” and presented at International 
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) in January 2012 
22 
1. Ensure this component/LRU 
is on hand in order to repair 
and/or replace when failed. 
 
2. Ensure personnel are trained 
in procedures for repair 
and/or replace. 
 
3. Ensure procedures are 
optimized for repair and/or 
replace. 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• GSDO RMA Team reports results and recommendations in Subsystem 
RMA reports 
– Example recommendations for RMA improvement: 
• Have redundant components on separate busses 
– Improved availability by an order of magnitude (0.995 to 0.9994) 
• Move control and monitoring to different Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) 
– Had redundant monitoring on same PLC (see next page) 
– Improved availability by three orders of magnitude (0.9993 to 0.999999) 
– Example recommendations for trades: 
• Tertiary power system provides little to no  
improvement in availability (0.999995 to  
0.999996); does not justify additional  
weight, space, and cost 
• Avionics architectures: triplex voter  
improves availability, however, self-checking  
pair does not 
23 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
24 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems 
• Effectively monitoring and tracking RMA analysis results for 
management 
– Management informed of risk to achieving requirements almost immediately 
• RMA tracking & reporting methodology effective and efficient in 
communicating recommendations for RMA improvements 
– Can quantify RMA improvements versus cost, scheduling, weight, space 
impacts 
25 
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RMA Analysis of GSDO Subsystems - Summary 
• GSDO requirements allocated to subsystems 
– Inherent Launch Availability is allocated to those subsystems in the launch 
countdown window 
– Operational Availability is allocated to those subsystems not included in the 
Inherent Launch Availability allocation, but needed in the event of a launch 
scrub 
• GSDO RMA team performing RMA analysis of subsystem designs and 
upgrades, as well as heritage subsystems 
– Analysis of heritage subsystems includes Weibull analysis to attempt to 
determine what type of failures experienced: Early failures (burn-in), Useful Life 
(random failures), Wearout 
• GSDO is tracking and reporting RMA analysis results of ground hardware 
and software components 
• FTA, FMEA, etc are performed as part of the design development cycle to 
drive out subsystem hazards and single failure points 
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27 
• Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
• Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
• Historical Component Failure Rate Determination 
• Component Burn-in and Test Time Requirements 
 
Other RMA Analyses 
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• Inductive (bottom-up) method where a table that describes the way or modes in which each 
system component can fail and assess the consequences of each of these failures is 
generated 
• Determines hardware criticality  
• Identifies failure modes that do not meet applicable Program reliability requirements  
• Identifies the potential for single point failures 
• Identifies areas where the design does not meet the failure tolerance requirements 
• Changed from qualitative to quantitative by assigning values to: 
1. Probability of the failure occurring,  
2. Severity of the effect of the failure on  
the operation of the systems,  
3. Probability that the system controls will 
detect and eliminate the failure before the  
design is complete. 
– The product of all three values is the risk  
priority number (rpn) 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Rating Description Criteria 
1 Very Low or None Minor nuisance 
2 Low or Minor Product operable at 
reduced performance 
3 Moderate or 
Significant 
Gradual performance 
degradation 
4 High Loss of function 
5 Very High or 
Catastrophic 
Safety-related 
catastrophic failures 
28 
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• Deductive (top-down) method that generates a symbolic logic model that traces 
and analyzes the failure paths from a predetermined, undesirable condition or 
event (called the top event) of a system to the failures or faults 
• Can be qualitative or quantitative – we do quantitative 
• FTA is an event-oriented analysis in contrast to the RBD, which is a structural-
oriented analysis 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
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• Systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with a 
complex system 
• Risk in PRA is defined as scenarios, associated frequencies, and associated 
consequences 
– Risk management involves prevention of adverse scenarios and promotion of favorable 
scenarios 
– NASA uses Risk metrics of probability of loss of vehicle, mission failure, etc 
• Goal is to describe how the system and its elements respond to an undesired 
initiating event, such as lightening or fire 
• Quantitative  
– Magnitude of the possible adverse consequence 
– Probability of the occurrence of each consequence 
• Include: 
– Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
– Common-Cause-Failure Analysis (CCF) 
 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
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Fault Trees 
Hazard Reports 
RBDs 
Event Tree 
Drawings 
FMEAs 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
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• Using 442 PRACA records: 
– Input into Weibull Analysis 
– Results: 
• It is in its useful life cycle, with 
random failures 
• β=1.0615 
• MTBF = 2991 hrs 
– Assumptions 
• Repair Time: 223 hrs 
• Inspection Time: 8 hrs 
– Maintainability 
• Maximum Availability = 87% 
• Inspection Time = 220 hrs 
 
Historical Component Failure Rate Determination 
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• RMA Analysis can determine product testing parameters 
– Reliability life testing can quantify reliability or safety goals 
– Burn-in test times can determine constant failure rates 
– Can determine acceptance test parameters 
• The Weibull shape parameter (β) corresponds to the different failure modes for 
components 
– Infant mortality when β is less than 1 
– Random defects when β is equal to 1 
– Wear-out when β is greater than 1 
• The results of system reliability  
analysis can be misleading if  
components are not properly  
up-screened (burned-in) or used  
under a certain bias condition  
where different failure modes may  
occur 
33 
Component Burn-in & Test Time Requirements 
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Why Have RMA Analysis in Design Process? 
34 
• RMA Analysis provides quantitative results, which can be used to justify 
component replacement, system upgrades, cost effectiveness of “abandon 
in place” concepts for systems, etc 
• GSDO RMA process allows for verification and traceability of RMA 
requirements 
• GSDO RMA Analysis encompasses entire design life cycle 
– RBDA 
– FMEA 
• RMA Analysis can be used to optimize timeline and launch availability 
results 
– Provide MTBF, failure distribution, MTTR, and repair probability to Ground 
System hardware and software 
• RMA Analysis can be used to optimize Logistics considerations 
– Spare parts need 
– Logistic Facility space 
 
 
– Preventative Maintenance requirements 
– Maintenance Personnel Requirements 
– FTA 
– PRA 
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GSDO RMA Analysis Papers 
• GSDO RMA Team Papers Published: 
– “On Component Reliability and System Reliability for Space Missions,” IEEE International 
Reliability Physics Symposium (IRPS) 2012, Anaheim, CA, 2012 
– “Comparison Modeling of System Reliability for Future NASA Projects,” Reliability, 
Availability, and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) 2012 Conference, Reno, NV, 2012. 
– “Constellation Ground Systems Launch Availability Analysis: Enhancing Highly Reliable 
Launch Systems Design,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) 
2010-2180, SpaceOps 2010 Conference, Huntsville, Alabama, 2010.  
 
• Future Papers for Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS) 2013 
(January 2013 in Orlando, FL): 
– “Allocating Reliability & Maintainability Goals to NASA Ground Systems” 
• Paper described GSDO RMA Allocation process for GSDO 
– “Determining Component Probability from Problem Report Data Used in Ground Systems 
for Manned Space Flight” 
• Describes process of capturing qualitative PRACA failure data for use to determine quantitative  
component reliabilities 
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Thank You 
Amanda M. Gillespie, ASQ CRE, Reliability Engineer 
Mail Code: SAIC-LX-O3| Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899 
Tel: 321.867.6741 |  Email: amanda.gillespie-1@nasa.gov or amanda.m.gillespie@saic.com  
 
Mark W. Monaghan, Ph.D., Reliability Engineer 
Mail Code: SAIC-LX-O3| Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899 
Tel: 321.867.0484  |  Email: mark.w.monaghan@nasa.gov or mark.w.monaghan@saic.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visit us at saic.com 
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Acronym & Abbreviation List 
Ai Inherent Availability 
Ao Operational Availability 
ASQ American Society for Quality 
CRE Certified Reliability Engineer 
CSA Cut Set Analysis 
CxP Constellation Program 
DoD Department of Defense 
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram 
FMEA Failure Mode & Effects Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GSDO 
Ground Systems Development and 
Operations 
IMA Importance Measure Analysis 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
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KSC-NE KSC Design Engineering 
MPCV Multi-Purpose Crewed Vehicle 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
MTTR Mean Time to Repair 
NASA 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PTC Parametric Technology Corporation 
R&M Reliability & Maintainability 
RAMS Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 
RBD Reliability Block Diagram 
RBDA Reliability Block Diagram Analysis 
RMA Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
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Acronym & Abbreviation List 
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 
SLS Space Launch System 
SSP Space Shuttle Program 
WQS Windchill Quality Solutions 
Wx Weather 
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